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Abstract
The commercialization of deep learning creates a
compelling need for intellectual property (IP) pro-
tection. Deep neural network (DNN) watermark-
ing has been proposed as a promising tool to help
model owners prove ownership and fight piracy.
A popular approach of watermarking is to train a
DNN to recognize images with certain trigger pat-
terns. In this paper, we propose a novel evolution-
ary algorithm-based method to generate and opti-
mize trigger patterns. Our method brings siginif-
icant reduction in false positive rates, leading to
compelling proof of ownership. At the same time,
it maintains the robustness of the watermark against
attacks. We compare our method with prior art
and demonstrate its effectiveness on popular mod-
els and datasets.
1 Introduction
Since the success of large scale neural networks in the early
2010s, we have witnessed an explosive growth in the field.
The popularity grew not only in academia but in the indus-
try as well. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become the
de facto solution to many complex computer vision, speech
recognition, and natural language processing problems. Pop-
ular as deep learning may be, building DDNs to solve real-
world problems remains an arduous task. It requires a vast
amount of high-quality labeled data and heavy use of com-
putational resources and human expertise. It goes without
saying that DNNs are invaluable technological assets that po-
tentially has huge commercial impacts. Over the past few
years, myriads of companies have joined the AI arms race.
Just among AI startups, investment from the venture capi-
tal market reached a record high $9.3 billion in 2018 [1].
Among the companies, many provide range from commer-
cial libraries for embedded systems, cloud machine learning
APIs to building private corporate clouds for AI, spanning
across industries like transportation, manufacturing, health-
care, finance, and consumer electronics.
While the DNNs are fueling commercial successes in the
AI market, a void in IP protection for DNN models may hin-
der the progress. When a model owner sells a service to a cus-
tomer, she should have a reliable way to prevent the customer
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Figure 1: Workflow of the trigger pattern-based black-box DNN wa-
termarking.
from illegally distributing or reselling it. To achieve that goal,
the owner not only needs to identify her own model when it is
distributed, but also prove the ownership to a trusted arbitra-
tor. Recently, several researchers proposed watermarking as a
viable solution to the IP protection problem in deep learning
[2][3][4] [5][6][7]. Digital watermarking originally refers to
the process of covertly embedding information in multimedia
content. The concept has since been extended to cover soft-
ware [8], circuits [9] as well as DNNs. White-box watermark-
ing embeds the owner’s information in the weights of a DNN.
Black-box watermarking, on the other hand, embeds the wa-
termark in the input-output behavior of the model. The set of
input used to trigger that behavior is called trigger set. For the
popular task of image classification, a common approach is to
assign a random label to trigger images and train the model
to classify accordingly. The non-triviality of ownership of
a watermarked model is constructed on the extremely small
probability for any other model to exhibit the same behavior
[4]. Through detecting the watermark in a DNN model, the
owner will be able to both identify and prove her ownership.
Based on the characteristics of their trigger sets, existing
black-box watermarking methods can be split into two cate-
gories. The first category of methods curates a finite set of
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special trigger images. The special images can be completely
random [4], samples derived from unused hidden space [5],
or adversarial examples [3]. Another category of methods
maintain trigger patterns and add them to natural input im-
ages to create trigger sets. The trigger patterns are usually
meaningful patterns that can serve as a proof of the owner’s
identity, such as the logos [6] and color-coded keys [7]. Fig-
ure 1 describes the workflow of the method. Some sample
trigger images are shown in Figure 2.
The motivation for designing the trigger sets are different
between those two categories of methods. The first is focused
on the functionality of the model. They aim to create trigger
sets such that watermarking is as orthogonal to the normal
functionality of the model as possible. The second, on the
other hand, is more focused on the watermarking extraction
procedure. Associating the owner’s identity with the trig-
ger set makes detection and proof of ownership much more
straightforward. The evident drawback of the first category is
the difficulty to establish a connection between the trigger set
and the owner. To solve that problem, researchers went as fars
as to use complex cryptographic tools [4]. Further, the limited
size of the trigger set weakens the proof of ownership. The
drawback of the second category lies in an inevitable trade-
off between the robustness of the watermark and potential of
false positive watermark detection. If a trigger pattern is too
prominent, then it risks triggering false positives in other neu-
ral networks. On the other, if a pattern is too inconspicuous,
it may be easily removed during fine-tune attacks.
In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between the differ-
ent trigger set generation methods. We propose a differential
evolution-based framework to determine how any given trig-
ger pattern should be added to the image such that false pos-
itive detections are reduced while the robustness of the wa-
termark is maintained. With our framework, trigger pattern-
based watermarking adds the model functionality to its equa-
tion, while still keeping ownership proofs simple. The contri-
bution of our paper are as follows:
• We proposed an evolutionary algorithm-based frame-
work to optimize trigger patterns in order to facilitate
robust and low-false-positive black-box watermarking
• We surveyed and compared existing trigger set genera-
tion methods and presented our analysis
• We implemented our method with popular DNN models
and datasets and evaluate its performance
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the watermarking problem in more details and de-
fines the problem. Section 3 presents our algorithm. Section
4 evaluates the performance of the proposed algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will first introduce the background of wa-
termarking. Then we will define our problem. Similar to
most of the security-related literature, we use the Alice / Bob
narrative to describe the scenario. Alice will be the model
owner. Bob will be the customer who buys the model from
Alice, and also the malicious attacker who tries to infringe on
Alice’s IP rights.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Examples of trigger inputs. (a) a random out-of-
distrbution image [4], (b) a regular image with a logo [6], (c) a reg-
ular image with a color-coded key not perceptible by the eye [7].
2.1 DNN Watermarking
Table 1: Criteria for evaluating DNN watermarks.
Criterion Explanation
Effectiveness The watermarking method can proveownership in different DNNs and datasets
Fidelity The watermark does not significantly affectthe performance of the model
False Positive
Rate
The watermark detection method will not
be triggered when there is no watermark
Robustness The watermark is robust against attacks
We define DNN watermarking as the process of covertly
embedding information in the DNN in order to verify and
prove an owner’s ownership. We focus on black-box water-
marking for image classification, which achieves the afore-
mentioned goal by embedding special input-output patterns
in DNNs. To embed the watermark, Alice will train a DNN
with both the regular dataset and the trigger set with specific
output labels. To detect the watermark, Alice will use a subset
of the trigger set as the input to the DNN and observe the out-
put. There will be a positive detection if certain probability
requirements are met.
A successful watermarking method has to meet several cri-
teria regarding its effectiveness, fidelity, false positive rate,
and robustness. A detailed description of the criterion is pre-
sented in Table 1. First, the effectiveness criterion states that a
watermark has to ensure successful and consistent detection.
The fidelity criterion states that watermarking cannot have a
significant negative impact on the regular functionality of the
model. False positive rate and robustness will be discussed
separately in the following subsections.
2.2 Proof of Ownership
A watermarking method’s ability to prove ownership mainly
relies on its low false positive rate. Suppose that Alice de-
cides that a watermark detection is positive if there are at
most ∆ misclassifications among N trigger images. Then
the probability of the detection can be calculated as follows
[7][5], assuming independence between the classification of
each trigger image. ρ represents the accuracy of the model on
the trigger set.
Pr =
∆∑
δ=0
(
N
δ
)
ρN−δ(1− ρ)δ (1)
The ownership is established based on the fact that Pr is
disproportionally small for a non-watermarked neural net-
work. If a watermarking method incurs a high false positive
rate (a high ρ for non-watermarked models), then Pr is no
longer small and that the proof of ownership will be incon-
clusive at best.
2.3 Threat Model
In this subsection, we introduce our notion of robustness by
defining our threat model. We assume that Bob has white-box
access to the model, but does not have access to the training
set. Instead, Bob has access to some proprietary test data (i.e.
a subset of test set). We argue that proprietary data is one of
the most important competitive advantages of Alice, and an
IP pirate Bob by no means should have access to it. Other-
wise, with the training data and the model, he might as well
train a new model on his own, especially when he has the
ability to carry out sophisticated attacks such as fine-tuning.
On the other hand, it is a reasonable assumption that the at-
tacker may have white-box access to the model architecture
and parameters. In the case of cloud ML service, Bob can
be a malicious service platform. In the case of software ML
libraries, Bob can be a hacker. In both cases, Bob would have
the full white-box access to the model. We also assume that
Alice only has black-box access to the model. In addition,
Alice will have direct access to input to the model. There are
no preprocessing stages between Alice’s input and the input
of the model.
With some test data and the model, Bob may fine-tune the
model to produce a slightly different version of it. That is
called the fine-tune attack. After the fine-tune attack, Alice’s
watermark should still exist. Some researchers also discussed
overwrite attacks, where Bob tries to embed his own water-
mark using the same procedure on Alice’s model. It is indeed
a very reasonable attack scenario. In our experiments, we
found that embedding a new watermark using Bob’s limited
amount of data would adversely affect the model’s perfor-
mance, rendering the model much less valuable. Thus we
rule out the possibility of Bob carrying out overwrite attacks.
2.4 Problem Definition
A DNN for classification is a function f : Rd → [0, 1]L.
Given an input X ∈ Rd, it is desired that the function classi-
fies it correctly to its label y, f(X) = y.
A pattern P ∈ Rd has the same dimensions as X , but is
much more sparse. In its image form, P ’s non-zero entries
can be considered as a set ofK pixels with explicitly designed
values and coordinates {vk, cxk, cyk}K . P is tightly coupled
with the identity of the model owner. And the absolute and
relative coordinates of the pixels may or may not contribute
to P ’s ability to carry information. The pattern can be em-
bedded on any input X from the intended data distribution
to convert it into a trigger input through a function g(X,P )
1. A watermarked DNN will be trained to classify g(X,P )
to y′i 6= yi. The fact that a DNN model classifies the trigger
inputs disproportionally correctly can serve as a unique proof
of the owner’s identity.
We consider two alternative approaches to create trigger
patterns. In the method proposed by Guo et al. (shown in
Figure 2(c)), a color-coded key serves as the trigger pattern
[7]. They embed the pattern by offsetting the pixel values of
the input, g(X,P ) = X+P . Since the information is mainly
ingrained in the pixel values, we consider the pixel locations
cxk, c
y
k to be flexible. We use Key throughout the paper to
denote this trigger pattern. The second approach we consider
is proposed by Zhang et al., and shown in Figure 2(b) [6]. The
information is obviously contained in the geometrical shape
of the logo and the pixels have to remain in a relatively fixed
to each other. Thus its location can be represented by its top
left corner cx, cy . The author did not explicitly say how they
embed the logo, but we interpret it as blending with the input,
g(X,P ) = (1 − α)X + αP . We denote the second type of
trigger pattern as Logo.
Our main goal is to find the P = {cxk, cyk}K such that the
probability of a non-watermarked DNN f0 classifying a trig-
ger input to its original labels is maximized. The main moti-
vation behind the goal is to minimize false positive watermark
detection. Empirically, given dataset D, then the goal can be
expressed as follows.
argmax
{cxk,cyk}K
|{X|f0(g(X, {vk, cxk, cyk}K)) = y,X, y ∈ D}| (2)
We have found that larger vk leads to more robust water-
marking, although it leads to higher false positives. In the
Key-related experiments, vk is given. But we can also in-
tegrate vk into the optimization landscape as follows. The
Logo-related experiments use this objective function.
argmax
{vk,cxk,cyk}K
|{X|f0(g(X, {vk, cxk, cyk}K)) = y,
X, y ∈ D}|+ δ
∑
k
vk
(3)
3 Method
In this section, we first provide a high level overview of why
we chose the DE framework and how it works. Then we delve
deeper to provide some algorithmic details that are crucial to
the convergence of DE.
3.1 Differential Evolution
To find the pattern P , the first methods that came up to us
were the gradient-based methods commonly used for find-
ing adversarial samples [10] [11] [12]. A key difference be-
tween our problem and theirs is that our pattern P is univer-
sal. Therefore, finding the gradient of individual inputs hardly
helps our situation. The family of evolutionary algorithms are
1For convenience, we sometimes write the function as
g(Xi, {vk, cxk, cyk}K).
Algorithm 1 Differential Evolution
Input: datasetD, non-watermarked DNN model f0, popular-
tion N , number of generations G
Output: best candidate P after evolution
1: Randomly intialize, ith candidate Pi = {vik, cxik, cyik}K
2: for generation g = 1, . . . , G do
3: for each candidate Pi do
4: Randomly pick 0 ≤ j, k, l < N where j 6= k 6= l
5: P ′i ← EVOLVE(Pj , Pk, Pl)
6: if FITNESS(P ′i , f0,D)> FITNESS(Pi, f0,D) then
7: Pi ← P ′i
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: return argmaxPi FITNESS(Pi, f0,D)
among the most prominent non-gradient-based optimization
methods. We initially relied on the generic evolutionary al-
gorithm (EA), but we were unable to find a reasonable set
of parameters to make the algorithm converge. That is when
differential evolution (DE) presented itself as an alternative.
DE is a metaheuristic search algorithm that optimizes a
given objective by evolving a population of candidates in par-
allel [13]. It follows the concept of generic EAs where a
population of candidates evolves, and the candidates that are
fittest will survive in each iteration. However, DE is simpler
and it is known to facilitate faster convergence to the global
optimum. Instead of using mutations and crossover between
two parents, candidates DE evolve over a triplet. A new can-
didate is created by adding a weighted difference between two
candidates to the third.
P = P0 + F × (P1 − P2) (4)
Algorithm 1 presents the high-level procedure of using DE
to solve our problem. The main idea is to generate 1) new
pixel coordinates 2) pixel values of P using the differential
variation operation described in Equation 4. The FITNESS
function can be either of the two objective functions described
in Section 2.4. The EVOLVE function, on the other hand, is
more complex. We describe more details of the function in
the next subsection.
3.2 Optimizations for DE
We use two different variants of EVOLVE functions for the
two existing trigger patterns, Key and Logo. For Logo, the
EVOLVE function is straightforward. We use the top left pixel
of the logo as the anchor, and each candidate can be repre-
sented by a simple triplet (v, cx, cy). We use DE to evolve and
select the location of the logo as well as its pixel values. We
use a different approach for Key. Since pixel locations are al
flexible, the candidate will be an array ofK tuples {cxk, cyk}K .
When we evolve using three candidates, each with K pixels,
which pixels should pair up and evolve becomes an important
question. If pixels are randomly paired up, it is likely that
the pixels will engage in a Brownian motion-like movement
across different generations. Consequently, as we empirical
show later, the evolution will not converge. If our goal is to
Algorithm 2 Evolve with Closest Triplet
Input: 3 candidates, each containing K pixel coordinates:
{cx1k, cy1k}K , {cx2k, cy2k}K , {cx3k, cy3k}K , differential weight F
Output: pixel coordinates of a new candidate, {cxk, cyk}K
1: procedure PAIR({cx1k, cy1k}K , {cx2k, cy2k}K)
2: Initialize heap
3: for each {cx1i, cy1i} do . Calculate pairwise distances
4: for each {cx2j , cy2j} do
5: Push distance({cx1i, cy1i}, {cx2j , cy2j}) in heap
6: end for
7: end for
8: while heap is not empty do . Pair by distance
9: distance, {cx1i, cy1i}, {cx2j , cy2j} ← Pop from heap
10: if Neither {cx1i, cy1i} or {cx2j , cy2j} is paired then
11: Pair ({cx1i, cy1i} with {cx2j , cy2j})
12: end if
13: end while
14: end procedure
15: PAIR({cx1k, cy1k}K , {cx2k, cy2k}K)
16: PAIR({cx1k, cy1k}K , {cx3k, cy3k}K)
17: for each {cx2i, cy2i}K {cx3j , cy3j}K paired with {cx1k, cy1k}K
do
18: cxk ← cx1k + F × (cx2i − cx3j)
19: cyk ← cy1k + F × (cy2i − cy3j)
20: end for
21: return {cxk, cyk}K
evolve the pixels into optimal locations, then it makes sense
to induce the evolution in such a way that pixels nearest to
an optimal location will move toward that location. To that
end, we propose an algorithm to pair closest pixels together
to evolve. The most efficient implementation is to store all
pairwise distances in heaps and always pair available pixels
with the smallest distances. Algorithm 2 describes implemen-
tation in more details. The time complexity of the algorithm
is O(K2log(K), where K is the number of pixels.
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Figure 3: Best fitness of the population across the generations.
Figure 3 shows the fitness of the best candidate over the
different generations. The FITNESS function is simply the ac-
curacy of the subset. The proposed method, closest triplet
evolve function, converged much faster than the evolve func-
tion where pixels are randomly paired together. In fact in the
latter case, the fitness plateau at around 0.89 and it is unclear
whether it will converge at all.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we report the performance evaulations of our
method. We first describe implementation details of the wa-
termarking procedure and the DE algorithm. Then we eval-
uate the effectiveness, fidelity, false positive rate and robust-
ness of the watermark in following subsections. Since nei-
ther Logo nor Key is an original idea from this paper, we
omit many repetitive experiments for brevity. The key is to
demonstrate the ability of our DE algorithm to reduce false
positive while maintaining the robustness of the watermark.
It is worth noting that all of our trigger sets are built from test
data that has not been used during training.
4.1 Differential Evolution
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: Output of our DE algorithm. (a) The Key trigger pattern
on CIFAR-10, (b) the Logo trigger pattern on CIFAR-10, (c) the
Key trigger pattern on MNIST, (d) a sample using the trigger pattern
in (a), (e) a sample using the trigger pattern in (b), (f) a sample using
the trigger pattern in (c).
We applied our DE-based approach on both Logo and Key
trigger pattern generation. We use Equation 3 as the fitness
function for Logo, where both pixel locations and values are
optimized. The weight β is set such that a maximum v consti-
tutes 5% of the fitness score. With the Key pattern, we only
optimize the pixel locations. In the fitness functions of both
DE algorithms, we evaluate the accuracy of candidates on a
random set of 640 training images. The model and dataset are
described in the next subsection.
We carried out experiments on both the MNIST dataset and
the CIFAR-10 dataset, and trigger patterns and trigger set im-
ages output by the DE algrithm are shown in Figure 4. To
create Logo patterns on the CIFAR-10 dataset, we replicated
the experiments by Zhang et al. [6]. Surprisingly, the optimal
Table 2: Classification accuracy of watermarked models on test sets
and trigger tests. The trigger sets are derived from the test sets using
the Key / Logo method.
Dataset Regular Watermarked
CIFAR-10
ResNet-18
Test 94.13 93.49
Trigger (Key) 1.08 93.67
Test 94.13 93.76
Trigger (Logo) 1.27 93.49
MNIST
4 CONV-2 FC
Test 99.46 99.38
Trigger (Key) 0.25 99.26
location to put the logo isn’t at one of the 4 corners as one
would intuitively think. In DE, we set vk = 255 searched the
coefficient for blending α instead, which yielded an optimal
value of 0.4019.
Like Guo et al. [7], we encoded the message in the pixel
values of the Key trigger pattern. The CIFAR-10 variant in-
cludes 64 pixels and encodes 128 bits of information. Ev-
ery pixel in the RGB color space with vk = ±100 encodes
2 bits, and the message can be decoded by reading the pix-
els from left to right, top to bottom. The MNIST variant
includes 192 pixels and encodes 192-bit information, with
vk = 100, 200 to encode 0 and 1 respectively. In both cases,
pixels in the Key pattern gravitate towards the edge of the im-
ages. Clearly, the DE algorithm is rewarding pixel locations
that do not overlap with the objects, which tend to occupy the
center of the image. The new pixel locations form patterns
in a way that has minimal impacts on the classification of an
object. Because of that, even we added patterns with large
pixel values, the resulting images still didn’t trigger regular
models.
To test the capacity of our algorithm, we intentionally used
patterns that have a lot more complexity in our experiments
on the MNIST dataset. Images in MNIST dataset has a lot
more empty space to take advantage of, while pixels blindly
accumulate at the edge may cause misclassification. Through
our algorithm, the probability Pr(f0(g(Xi, P )) = yi) in-
creased from as low as 83.30% (during random initialization)
to 99.27%. The probability is measured over the entire trig-
ger set, and the classification accuracy on the regular test set
with the exact same images is 99.46. It clearly shows the al-
gorithms ability of learning to reduce false positive detections
of the watermark. To test our DE algorithm’s ability to con-
verge, we repeated the MNIST/CIFAR10 ”key” on 8 different
parameter sets (number of pixels in the pattern, etc.), 5 exper-
iments per set. Eat set all converged to solutions that produce
extremely similar fitness scores, with an average standard de-
viation of 0.0060.
4.2 Effectiveness and Fidelity
It has been demonstrated in all previous works that DNNs can
be trained to successfully recognize the triggers sets. In addi-
tion, Adi et al. also showed the significance of start training
from scratch in creating a robust watermark [4]. We followed
the same procedure. Table 2 shows the classification accu-
racy of both non-watermarked and watermarked models on
the regular test set and the trigger set.
In light of the fidelity criterion, the classification accuracy
of the watermarked model on the regular test set is sligtly
lower compared to the regular non-watermarked model. It is
expected as watermarking makes the classification problem
much harder. In light of the effectiveness criterion, the ability
of the watermarked model to recognize the trigger set is as
good as its ability to classify regular images.
4.3 False Positives
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Figure 5: False positive rates of different CIFAR-10 trigger sets. It is
the probability of a non-watermarked DNN getting falsely triggered.
The lower the false positive rate the better.
Figure 5 shows the false positive rate of different trigger
patterns. The false postive rate here is measured by the prob-
ability that a non-watermarked model classifies a trigger im-
age into its re-assigned class Pr(f0(g(Xi, P ) = y′i). We used
four different non-watermarked DNN trained on the regular
CIFAR-10 dataset: ResNet-18, ResNet-50, DenseNet-121,
VGG-16. The fitness function in DE used to obtain the trig-
ger pattern only involves the ResNet-18 model. The results
show that the what our DE learns from one model generalizes
well to other models as well. We tested the generalizability
further using the same pattern on 5 newly trained VGG-13s,
and obtained a 95% confidence interval of 1.15%± 0.06%.
We used two baselines for comparison. To compare with
the DE-based Key pattern, we used a Key pattern with ran-
dom {xk, yk}K but the same vk. We see drastic improve-
ments with up to 10× reduction in the false positive rate. Note
that the trigger pattern proposed by Guo et al. is also based on
random location [7]. But they explicitly selected vk such that
the pattern is imperceptible, resulting in a lower false posi-
tive rate. But as we see later, they achieved that at the cost
of robustness. To compare with the DE-based Logo, we use
Logo trigger pattern used Zhang et al. [6]. We achieve about
2× improvement in false positive rate. Putting it in the per-
spective of Equation 1, even 2× translates to over 25000×
lower probability (∆ = 5, N = 20).
4.4 Robustness
We measure the robustness of the watermarking methods
through their resistance against fine-tune attacks. Table 3
reports trigger set classification accuracy loss after we fine-
tuned a watermarked model. Unlike some of the earlier
Table 3: Classification accuracy of watermarked models on corre-
sponding CIFAR-10 trigger sets after fine-tune attacks. The less the
accuracy loss, the more robust the method is.
Method Accuracy loss (%)
Key, DE -0.29
Key, [7] -73.97
Logo, DE -1.01
Logo, [6] -0.97
approaches that based their attack on the training set, we
used 1000 test images and applied various data augmenta-
tion techniques. The model watermarked using the original
key method suffered a significant drop in accuracy. The ac-
curacy drop was almost entirely eliminated when we switch
to our key method. Both of the logo method were resilient
against the fine-tune attack.
Images superimposed with our pattern are sufficiently dif-
ferent from the normal input distribution. Because of that,
a watermarked model’s ability to recognize those patterns
is largely orthogonal to its ability to classify objects and is,
therefore, harder to remove during a fine-tune attack.
4.5 Discussions
Gradient-free methods do exist in the world of adversarial
learning, most notably in the subproblem of black-box at-
tacks, where the attackers don’t have access to the gradient
information [14][15][16][17]. Those methods again focus
on individual samples and are essentially solving a differ-
ent problem than ours. It is worth noting that the work from
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. aims at creating universal adversarial
perturbations [18]. Their proposal to reduce the search space
to a subset of the input provided invaluable insights.
Due to the limited scope of this paper, the parameter vk
isn’t systematically studied. It is more a heuristic and manu-
ally selected in many situations. It would be valuable to study
how it systematically affects the robustness of the watermark-
ing methods.
5 Conclusion
Black-box DNN watermarking has emerged as a viable solu-
tion to IP protection in the context of MLaaS. Adding owner
identity-based trigger patterns to natural input images is a
popular method to create effective trigger sets that establish
strong ownership proofs. In this paper, we propose a novel
differential evolution-based framework to optimize the gener-
ation of such trigger patterns. Compared to the prior art, our
method demonstrates significant improvement in false pos-
itive rate and robustness in experiments on popular models
and datasets.
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